Ballon d’Or and the Credibility Question

By: Amir Abdulazeez

I am writing on this not because I have any significant concern for the award or its credibility or because it has any correlation with the wellbeing of anybody in need (which I am often more concerned about). I am rather doing so due to the massive perennial debate it generates especially among youths in Nigeria as well as the misinformed opinions around it. Again, the Ballon d’Or like football itself has transcended sport to become part of international politics and history. I became shocked when I saw a globally renowned Muslim scholar congratulating Ousmane Dembele for winning the 2025 version and hailing its award to a ‘practicing Muslim’. Obviously, the crown now carries political significance that stretches well beyond the pitch.

Since its inception in 1956, the Ballon d’Or has been regarded as football’s most prestigious individual award. Founded by France Football (conceived by sports writers Gabriel Hanot and Jacques Ferran), the award was initially designed to honour the best European player annually, with Stanley Matthews of Blackpool becoming the pioneer winner. Later, it evolved into a global prize, celebrating many other icons. Many have rightly questioned the credibility of the award but mostly on myopic grounds centred around player and club sentiments. However, as a long time football observer, I believe there are much broader issues regarding the credibility of the award that are worth discussing.

Let us start with the politics. During the Cold War (1947-1991), Eastern European players (more aligned to the Soviet Union) often struggled to receive equal recognition despite dazzling performances, while Western European stars (more aligned to the United States and friends) enjoyed more favourable media attention. Although Russian goalkeeper Lev Yashin won the award in 1963, many argue that his case was only the exception that proved the unwritten rule of ‘politics, geography and media exposure consistently play decisive roles’. Today, the award continues to reflect broader inequalities in football. European clubs dominate global coverage, which inflates the recognition of their stars. Players performing in less visible leagues whether in South America, Africa, or Asia rarely receive consideration, even if their contributions are extraordinary.

Another concern is the award’s inconsistent eligibility rules over time. Until 1995, only European players competing in European clubs were considered, excluding legendary figures like Pelé and Diego Maradona from getting even a nomination. It was only after a rule change that non-Europeans in European leagues became eligible, allowing George Weah to win in 1995. Yet, by then, the award had already excluded decades of worthy non-European and non-European based winners. Mild allegations of racism also cast a dark shadow over the award. Many believe players like Didier Drogba, Samuel Eto’o, Yaya Touré, Sadio Mané and Mohammed Salah were routinely ranked below their pedigree. In 2021, French pundit Emmanuel Petit openly questioned whether African players were judged by double standards.

The selection of voters itself raises concerns. Initially restricted to journalists, it later expanded between 2010 and 2015 after a merger with FIFA’s “World Player of the Year,” adding coaches and captains to the electorate whose votes often reflected tribal, national or club loyalties rather than merit. The 2016 reversion to journalist-only voting is perhaps a tacit admission of voting flaws thereby creating difficulties in comparisons across eras. For example, Lionel Messi’s consecutive wins (2009-2013) under a global, mixed electorate cannot be objectively compared to Michel Platini’s (1983-1985) under a European-only jury. The current co-organization with UEFA, which began in 2024, signifies another attempt to lend the award more institutional weight. However, the constant changes in its format and governing alliances suggest an award in search of a stable identity, struggling to balance its commercial ambitions with its original purpose.

Bias towards attacking players has been an emerging hallmark of Ballon d’Or selections. Legendary defenders like Paolo Maldini, Alessandro Nesta, Sergio Ramos and Roberto Carlos, who defined an era of defensive excellence, always fell short. The exception of Fabio Cannavaro in 2006 along with few others in the past, after a World Cup-winning campaign with Italy, serves as a testament to the rarity of a defender being recognized. More recently, Virgil van Dijk’s 2019 narrow runner-up finish sparked debate about whether non-attacking players could ever realistically win in a sport increasingly obsessed with goals and flair. The award relies heavily on football journalists who often prioritize goal highlight reels, statistics and global recognition over tactical nuance and defensive brilliance. Strikers and playmakers dominate the headlines that directly feeds into voting behaviour.

To combat positional bias, a more revolutionary approach could be implemented; nomination by quota. Why not have separate shortlists and voting panels for goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders and forwards? The top three or five of these categories could then be considered for the overall voting and eventual award. This would ensure that the unique skills of each position are evaluated by those who best understand them, guaranteeing that players are judged on their specializations rather than against others with contrasting roles.

The criteria for judgment also lack clarity and consistency. Officially, the award considers individual performance, team achievements, talent, fair play and career consistency. In practice, however, voters often seem swayed by a single outstanding tournament or by sentimental narratives. Luka Modrić’s 2018 victory after Croatia’s World Cup run exemplified this. While Modrić was superb, critics argued that other players had stronger year-round performances, but the emotional weight of Croatia’s fairy tale run tilted the scales. But how comes, this same emotion did not sway voters to select any player from Leicester City’s 2016 Premier League incredible winning team? A pervasive, though often unstated, criterion for many voters is team success. To win the Champions League or a major international tournament has become almost a prerequisite for contention. This creates an inherent unfairness, elevating players in dominant teams while punishing extraordinary individuals in less successful sides. This inconsistency reveals a fundamental confusion: is the award for the "best player", “most popular player” or the "most successful player"?

The timing and calendar controversies is another issue. International tournaments occur every two years, creating periods where national team success heavily influences voting. World Cup years traditionally favour tournament winners, regardless of club form. The recent calendar change to August-July aimed to address this imbalance but created new problems, with voters now contending with assessing performances from overlapping seasons and tournaments. This temporal confusion affects not just voting patterns but public understanding of what the award actually represents; is it recognition for calendar year performance, season achievement or tournament success? The 2013 Ballon d'Or win by Cristiano Ronaldo was critiqued following timing inconsistencies from odd deadline extensions. The current system, which can see a player win a major tournament in the summer and have their performance rewarded a year later, creates a disjointed narrative.

The question of authority is another big one. FIFA represents 211 national associations, UEFA oversees European football's institutional framework, yet it is a private French publication that bestow football's most prestigious individual honour. The comparison with FIFA’s The Best awards and UEFA’s Player of the Year exposes this imbalance. This raises the paradox: why should a magazine possess such outsized influence in determining football’s most prestigious individual accolade, overshadowing awards backed by governing institutions? While there is nothing fundamentally wrong with this, it only emphasizes the need for France Football to show more responsibility by sanitizing and standardizing its award.

I am not in a position to coach France Football on how to reform its awards to minimize the credibility dilemma, they have much better experts who can do that. My concern is to see young football followers and analysts become more informed and equipped for deeper debates that are beyond sentiments. My other concern which has little to do with the Ballon d’Or is to see football giving a little back to its estimated 3.5 billion fans that have made it powerful. While fans give it a lot, the sport appears to be giving almost nothing significant in return. It is sad to see football remaining silent, bias and indifferent in the face of global oppression and injustice. While it took FIFA and UEFA just four days to suspend Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both bodies have remained criminally silent over two years since Israel launched its genocide on the football supporting people of Palestine.

 

24-09-2025

The United Nations and Eight Decades of Impotence

 13^th September, 2025

By: Amir Abdulazeez

The United Nations is currently holding its 80^th General Assembly sessions in New York. Some days earlier, the U.S. State Department, under the pretext of national security and anti-terrorism laws, revoked visas for dozens of Palestinian officials, including President Mahmoud Abbas slated to participate, at the General Assembly and a high-level two-state conference. This move drew criticism from the UN itself, EU and some human-rights groups, with calls to relocate Palestinian-related meetings outside New York. This echoes historical precedents, notably the 1988 visa denial to Late Yasser Arafat, which forced the UN to shift one of its sessions to Geneva to allow him participate.

Although the 1947 ‘Headquarters Agreement’ obliges the United States to admit all UN participants, Washington occasionally and selectively invoke security and legal excuses to discriminate between entrants. Such practices explain how the UN’s operations remain vulnerable to U.S. control, thereby undermining its independence, authority and credibility. As the UN marks the 80^th anniversary of the ratification of its charter on 24^th October 2025, the organization which was founded on the ashes of World War II in 1945 faces an existential crisis of credibility and effectiveness.

While it has achieved notable successes in humanitarian aid, educational research and global environmental and health initiatives, its core mission of maintaining international peace and security has been repeatedly undermined by structural and diplomatic flaws. The organization's inability to meaningfully respond to crises from Syria to Ukraine and most visibly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has exposed fundamental weaknesses that warrant urgent reform. The UN’s record is one of profound paradox: a body designed for action but often defined by its inaction. Nowhere is this impotence more starkly illustrated than in its 70 years’ failure to resolve the Palestinian question or to hold Israel accountable for its international impunities.

From the outset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United Nations assumed a central role by proposing the 1947 Partition Plan, which sought to establish separate independent states for both parties. Although initially conceived as a potential path to peace, the plan was never enforced and the UN has since struggled to translate its own decisions into reality. Further failures are documented in a paper trail of unimplemented resolutions: Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) called for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied during the Six-Day War; Resolution 338 (1973) and countless subsequent resolutions reaffirmed this demand that was not only ignored but instead empowered Israel’s massive expansion of illegal settlements.

Beyond the unimplemented resolutions, a critical UN failure in this regard is that of narrative framing. It has been unable to consistently enforce a foundational principle: that the right to self-determination for one people (Israelis) cannot be predicated on the denial of that same right to another (Palestinians). The organization's various bodies often treat the conflict as a symmetrical dispute between two equal parties, rather than an asymmetrical struggle between a nuclear-armed occupying power and a stateless, occupied population living under a brutal blockade.

The core of the UN’s ineffectiveness lies in the flawed decision-making structure of its Security Council, where the five permanent members (United States, Russia, China, France and United Kingdom) hold the autocratic privilege of veto power. This system of outdated World War II geopolitics has frequently paralyzed the organization in hours of need. Since 1946, the veto has been selfishly exercised about 300 times. Between 2011 and 2023, Russia and China blocked 16 resolutions on Syria, enabling the Assad regime’s brutal campaign against civilians. The United States, meanwhile, has used its veto more than 50 times to shield Israel from accountability, making Palestine the single most vetoed issue in UN history. Instead of serving as a platform for global security, the Council has become an arena for shameless and hypocritical power politics.

The General Assembly, despite representing all 193 member states equally, has been relegated to a largely ceremonial role in matters of international peace and security. While the Assembly can pass resolutions by majority vote, these carry no binding legal force and are routinely ignored by powerful nations. The 2012 resolution calling for an arms embargo on Syria passed with 133 votes but had no practical effect, as Russia continued supplying weapons to the Assad government. This has created a two-tiered system where the views of the international majority are systematically subordinated to the interests of Security Council Super Powers.

The selective enforcement of international law has become a defining hallmark of UN impotence. While the organization has at times demonstrated resolve such as coordinating global sanctions against apartheid South Africa in the 1980s or authorizing military intervention in Libya in 2011, its responses to other similar crises have been inconsistent and politically driven. Similarly, the International Criminal Court, often operating with UN support, swiftly indicted leaders of Liberia, Sudan and Libya, yet no Western or allied leaders like George W. Bush or Tony Blair have been held to account for baseless interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan or Yemen. These double standards have eroded the UN’s credibility and moral authority, particularly in the Global South, where it is increasingly viewed as an instrument of Western hegemony.

The UN's peacekeeping apparatus, while successful in some contexts, has also demonstrated significant limitations when confronting determined state actors. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have maintained buffer zones during their operations, but have been powerless to prevent violations by all parties. During the 2006 Lebanon War and subsequent conflicts, these forces could only observe and report violations rather than enforce compliance.

Financial manipulation has emerged as another tool of selective pressure within the UN system. The United States, which contributes 22% of the UN's regular budget, has repeatedly withheld or threatened to withhold funding to pressure the organization on specific issues. In 2018, the Trump administration cut $285 million from UN peacekeeping operations and reduced contributions to various UN agencies. The UN's human rights mechanisms face similar challenges of selective application and political manipulation. The Human Rights Council, reformed in 2006 to address criticisms of its predecessor, continues to be influenced by bloc voting and political considerations rather than objective human rights assessments. Countries with questionable human rights records have served on the Council while using their positions to deflect criticism and protect allies.

Critics argue that the UN has become a stage for symbolic debates while real decisions and tangible actions are outsourced to global bullies like the US, less formal coalitions like the NATO and regional actors like the EU. For example, the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states without addressing core Palestinian concerns while side-lining the UN. Similarly, its response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was limited to humanitarian aid and symbolic condemnation, as bodies like EU looked more relevant and assertive.

The rise of new global powers and changing geopolitical realities have rendered the UN's 1945 structure increasingly obsolete. Reform proposals have circulated for decades but have consistently failed due to the resistance of existing power holders. Things have changed since World War II, nations have evolved, others have declined and hence the UN must be reformed to reflect current realities. The permanency of the Security council membership must be reviewed and the senseless veto authority must be abolished or modified along the lines of justice and accountability. As the United Nations approaches its 80th anniversary, the choice is clear: fundamental reform or continued irrelevance.

Maintaining the United Nations system costs about $50–55 billion per year, not counting military deployments and opportunity costs. Beyond money, states commit significant diplomatic, military, humanitarian and bureaucratic resources to maintain their participation. This makes the UN one of the most resource-intensive international organizations ever created. Without serious reforms to address structural inequalities, eliminate veto abuse and restore the primacy of international law over great power politics, the UN risks becoming a historical footnote rather than the cornerstone of the global governance its founders envisioned. The international community must decide whether it will tolerate continued dysfunction or demand the transformative changes necessary to address 21^st century challenges.