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Tuesday, December 15, 2015

Shia-Military Clashes and the Road to Anarchy By Ahmed Musa Hussaini

13th December, 2015



F
or the past 24 hours, I have been keenly following the tragic turn of events in Zaria and the numerous commentaries that follow. It is difficult to exonerate both sides from blame. But what is happening is both avoidable and inevitable: avoidable if we were proactive in preempting emerging conflict scenarios, and inevitable because it was very obvious that Shia activities along the busy Sokoto road are a recipe for clashes.

I have lived in Zaria and had warned about the potential for conflict between the Shia sect and other rival Muslim sects and non-Muslim groups. Two things are very clear in the ongoing conflict: initial Shia provocation and contempt for constituted authority and the Nigerian military's overreaction and high-handedness.
We have to understand the history between the two to arrive at the causes and likely consequences of the ongoing conflict.

But, What Actually Happened?
Shia activities blocked traffic along the ever busy Sokoto road, the COAS convoy was caught in the unfortunate mix and the COAS was personally negotiating his passage when a projectile was hurled at his direction and all hell broke loose. The soldiers guarding the COAS responded with live fire. The Nigerian military called it an assassination attempt on its head because the projectile was metallic and fired from a device. The Shia movement called it an unprovoked atttack on their defenseless members.

But it was not yet over. Military reinforcement later came in as a show of force and in order 'to teach the Shia a lesson.' The rest is now tragedy recorded in a rapidly rising casualty toll.
It is obvious that the ongoing conflict is built on a foundation of decades of distrust between the sect and the Nigerian state and its instruments of power, a distrust that is at the heart of Shia ideology. Events of last year are still fresh in the memories of both the sect and the military, and both sides reacted to the ongoing situation with the cumulative fury of past grievances.

The response of the military at the Husainiyyah area was at best, understandable, and can be somewhat justified on the argument of defending the COAS with all options, but the military's subsequent mobilization to Gyallesu, the destruction of Zakzaky's residence and murder of his family members and followers leave much to be desired. It was disproportionate, indefensible and extrajudicial.

There is no doubt that our laws, both Islamic and secular, do not confer or transfer burden of culpability on/to an individual by virtue of kinship to an alleged perpetrator of a crime, much less the power to destroy his house or kill his family or relatives.

The argument that no Nigerian religious group has the right to block traffic (whether civilian or military) is non-debatable, so also is the argument that our Armed Forces should deploy proportionate force in quelling internal conventional uprising. I believe, after securing the COAS passage, arresting Zakzaky becomes an internal security affair that is better conducted by the police and can be effected via simple invitation as both groups were expected to work towards de-escalating the situation.
That did not happen.

It is also true that Zakzaky is to blame for the conduct of his members, for indoctrinating them on a steady ideological diet that secular governments are evil and must be disrespected and held in utmost contempt. He leads a parallel quasi-political movement side by side a spiritual one that is akin to a state within a state with the ultimate aim (in theory) of dethroning the existing order and replacing it with an Iran-style theocracy. This type of teaching is a recipe for conflict and no serious state would tolerate that in the long run.

Superficially, there is no problem in pursuing any ideology one feels strongly about, the right of religion is fundamental and non-derogable. But while Zakzaky understands the difference between his ideological rhetoric and strategic pragmatism of the Nigerian state and its agents, most of his followers don't, and will seek ways to translate their revolutionary rhetoric into actions. That is what was probably in the mind of that lone Shiite that hurled a projectile at the COAS direction. He never realized the true gravity of his action and its symbolic and real implications on the capability and image of the Nigerian army.

There is also a sense of a siege mentality, a persecution complex among Nigerian Shiites that is reinforced by anti-Shia sentiments and discrimination within the largely sunni Nigerian Muslim community. It is true that the Shiites are targeted for some infractions that would be tolerably condoned if perpetrated by mainstream Muslim groups and even genuine Shia grievances are dismissed as the intra-Muslim affair that they are by non-Muslim groups, or as illegitimate ranting of a heretical group by the mainstream Sunni majority. But it is also true that Zakzaky deliberately sought to build his group on that narrative of sectarian victimhood that characterized Shia's evolution through centuries of Islamic history.

It is high time the Shia discard that old fashioned narrative and embrace pragmatism. Religious groups should not operate with impunity. They must respect the existing laws of the country. Religious groups are expected to embrace and legitimize a national master narrative and inculcate the virtues of law and order into their adherents and not promote impunity and contempt for the rule of law and right of others.

Behind this veneer of perennial conflicts between the Shia sect and the Nigerian security agencies is a latent Iran-Saudi and Iran-Israel rivalry at play, and this must be thoroughly investigated if we are looking for lasting solutions. There are many internal and external dimensions or what I call externally instigated internal dimensions to the ongoing conflict which are beyond the scope of public discourse, and which if not handled carefully may snowball into another national security challenge. We must do everything to prevent Nigeria from becoming another battleground for Middle-East geopolitics.

But fundamentally, we have to reexamine the role of religious groups, the military and other security agencies in a truly democratic Nigerian setting. Because if we allow religious groups to operate with impunity, and our security agencies confront impunity with more impunity, then we ask for more Boko Haram, and more Boko Haram we shall get, and we will never cease to wonder why our problems continue to defy solutions.

May God heal our wounds!


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